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uofffff .... yakuza2007 ... 99% din echipamentele folosite intr-o casa normala functioneaza cam pe aceeasi frecventa radio ca si wifi-ul (de la telefoane mobile la telecomenzi si aparatura de supraveghere).. DAR (pt ca intotdeauna exista un DAR) ceea ce zici tu cu radiografiile e complet eronat pt ca aparaturile care emit radiatii foarte puternice (rmn,cuptor cu microunde,etc.) sunt proiectate in asa fel incat sa le emita pe o distanta foarte scurta la intensitate foarte mare si doar intr-o directie pe cand wifi-ul emite pe distante relativ mari la intensitate mica si in toate directiile. Gandeste-te ca, cuptorul cu microunde emite intr-o cutie izolata de 0.013832 m^3 la 700W pe cand routerul wifi emite intr-un spatiu de 135m^3 la 24W fara sa mai luam in calcul si peretii ("calcule" facute pe aparatura mea)... Oricum ... spectrul electromagnetic se compune din mai multe lungimi de unda ... de la raze gama (scurte) la undele radio (lungi...normal)... cele mai periculoase fiind cele scurte (Gama, UV (da...de asta te dai cu lotiuni la plaja), Raze X) pentru ca au radiatii ionizante si de obicei au lungimea de unda mai scurta decat lumina ! Wifi-ul lucreaza pe lungimi de unda mai mari decat a luminii in aceeasi categorie cu telefoanele,telecomenzile, etc.,(infra-red,microunde,radio) si sunt considerate a fi mult mai putin daunatoare ... Daca ce spui tu ar fi adevarat, sistemele de incalzire cu panouri radiante (50*40 cm la 500W) ar trebui sa te prajeasca incet de la interior catre exterior ... Este adevarat ca unii pot fi mai sensibili decat altii la undele electromagnetice (dureri de cap and shit) ... dar in acelasi timp altii sunt intoleranti la lactoza ... deci efectele radiatiilor vor fi diferite de la o persoana la alta! (Read)

1. Distanta pe care poate transmite o antena wifi, desi este influentata si de dBi (prin calitatea semnalului), nu iti poate fi garantata de nici un echipament si tine mai mult de marime si inaltimea la care sunt puse antenele. 2. La tine 48 dBi = 2 Km ... In Italia 35 dBi = 300 Km (Link) 3. Tehnic discutant nu ai idee despre ce vorbesti ... Frecventele TV sunt sub 1000 MHz iar frecventele Wifi sunt intre 2400-2500 MHz (2.4 GHz) sau intre 5725-5875 MHz (5 GHz) 4. Informeaza-te inainte de a deschide gura (sau inainte de a atinge tastatura in functie de situatie).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xFAoGp7OG6M#t=13

@vulturul: economia unei tari nu este impusa de exporturi ... americanii fac parte din piata de desfacere nu de productie... pretul barilului de petrol nu este impus de americani (influentat poate dar putin) si chiar daca e in $ platim acelasi pret ca si ei ! La orice semn de instabilitate al americii pretul va urca (nu neaparat pt inchiderea guvernului ... razboiul din siria e un factor puternic acum)

Vorbim la general aici ... nu vreau sa dam nume ...

Ar trebui sa va pese ... intr-o economie mondiala condusa de ei, orice instabilitate se poate transforma intr-un dezastru economic pentru statele partenere (de obicei cele mai putin importante), iar ca exemplu ... vezi criza in care suntem (motivele care au dus la ea) ... In alta ordine de idei ... @Brenin: Mor pt ca sunt platiti sa isi asume niste riscuri ... nu vrei sa mori nu te inrolezi in armata (mai ales pe timp de razboi si mai ales cand viata ta e mai ieftina decat viata lor)... @Nytro: teoretic si mie imi pare bine ... practic nu te mai kk pe tine ca ne afecteaza mai mult pe noi decat pe ei ! @Pacalici: Fa-ti griji pt tine ... 99.9% din deciziile economice ale tarii noastre sunt luate dupa discutii cu partenerii externi iar SUA e no. 1 pe lista !

una este antena ... alta este placa de retea (NIC = network interface controller ) ... sa nu faci confuzie intre cele 2 ... antena pe care ai aratat-o tu este doar antena de receptie care se conecteaza printr-o mufa pigtail la placa ta wifi (NIC). Daca ai laptop si vrei sa conectezi o antena externa de genul va trebui sa desfaci carcasa (de obicei nu afecteaza garantia) si sa conectezi mufa la NIC (cam asa ceva numai ca firul si antena vor "atarna" pe langa laptop si trebuie sa fii atent sa nu o smulgi/rupi/shit) ! Daca achizitionezi o placa de retea externa (gen alfa ...) tot ce trebuie sa faci e sa o conectezi prin USB, sa instalezi driverele si sa iti faci de cap (o poti folosi la orice pc cu usb)! Ai grija ce iti comanzi sa nu dai banii aiurea ...

@fergmunah ...asta e relativ ... in functie de pereti/obstacole and shit ... nici un echipament nu iti poate garanta o anumita distanta ! Alfa sunt printre cele mai fiabile si cunoscute marci de echipamente Wifi asa ca , sigur nu poti da gres cu una .. (si in plus e NIC nu doar antena pentru receptie) Daca te intereseaza doar receptia semnalului te poti orienta catre o antena omnidirectionala Yagi (pentru exterior) ...

LINK ...

De asta cand faci raportul le trimiti prinscreen fara parametri si totul cenzurat ... cand si daca raspund intrebi de bounty si abia dupa le arati poc-ul...

pune parola la inceputul listei ... vezi daca merge asa .. incearca si cu alte softuri pt bruteforce .. oclhashcat daca ai ATI sau cudahashcat daca ai nvidia ... John The Ripper... google for it ... orice soft mai da cu virgula cateodata... think outside the box si orienteaza-te in functie de necesitati ...

Router daca deschizi un cmd in windows si scrii "ipconfig /all" sau o consola in linux si scrii "ifconfig" vei observa ca ip-ul alocat nic-ului este unul diferit fata de cel dat de LINK ... routerul iti creaza un lan cu un alt set de ip-uri fata de cel alocat de isp-ul tau...

castiel se refera la suita de programe aircrack-ng ... dar pt astaa iti trebuie handshake ... daca ai bagat parola la wifi si esti/nu esti conectat la el o poti vedea in felul urmator (in windows 7): 1. Control Panel -> Network and Internet -> Network and Sharing Center -> Manage wireless networks 2. Click dreapta pe reteaua la care vrei sa vezi parola -> Properties -> Security -> si bifeaza Show characters

da ... un sniffer in retea ... poti incerca in MITM si poate prinzi ceva (ma refer la parole & shit)... daca nu poti folosi wireshark pentru a vedea traficul din retea ....

Informatia este gravata cu ajutorul laserului, materialul fiind stabil chiar si la temperaturi de 1000°C. Cu ani in urma, foloseam dischete, apoi am trecut la CD-uri si DVD-uri. Acum, oamenii de stiinta de la Universitatea din Southampton au creat un nou suport pentru stocarea informatiilor, un suport creat din straturi de sticla nanostructurate. Discul poate rezista la temperaturi de pana la 1000°C, ceea ce il face, practic, indestructibil. "Cristalul de memorie Superman", asa cum i-au spus cercetatorii, ar putea schimba total felul in care stocam noi informatia. Un singur disc ar avea 360 de tera de spatiu, o capacitate impresionanta. Datele inregistrate pe un astfel de disc rezista timp de un milion de ani. Descoperirea a fost realizata de o echipa de cercetatori tineri ai universitatii britanice. Ideile care pot schimba lumea pot sa aparea chiar si la varste fragede. Iata cateva proiecte uimitoare realizate de tinerii din Romania inscrisi pe platforma SmartNation.ro "E palpitant sa te gandesti ca am creat primul document care cel mai probabil ca supravietui mai mult decat rasa umana "(Peter Kazansky, cercetator) Inventia, una cu adevarat spectaculoasa, i-a facut pe cei de la Centrul de Cercetare Optoelectrica al Universitatii sa se gandeasca la celebrele "cristale de memorie" pe care Superman le tine ascunse in "Fortareata Singuratatii". Informatia este gravata in trei straturi de "nanopuncte", separate de spatii minuscule. Nanostructurile care se asambleaza singure schimba felul in care lumina trece prin sticla, modificand polarizarea luminii intr-un mod care poate fi apoi citita folosind un microscop optic si un polarizator asemanator ochelarilor de soare polarizati care exista si la noi in magazine. Suportul va fi foarte folositor organizatiilor care au arhive de mari dimensiuni fara a mai exista teama deteriorarii informatiilor. Sursa not security news .. but still news ...

Students hijack luxury yacht with GPS spoofing A team of university students have demonstrated that it is possible to subvert global positioning system navigation signals to pilot a superyacht without tripping alarms. The experiment was conducted in June this year, with the permission of the owners of a 65-metre (213ft) superyacht worth US$80 million (A$87 million), the White Rose that sailed from Monaco to the island of Rhodes in the Mediterranean. A team of mechanics students from the Cockrell School of Engineering at the University of Texas in Austin were on board the White Rose, with the experiment taking place some 50 kilometres off the coast of Italy in international waters. Faint GPS signals were broadcast by the students from a spoofing device the size of a briefcase, aimed at the positioning system aerials of the ship. The authentic GPS signals were slowly overpowered by those transmitted from the spoofing device, after which the students had gained control over the yacht's navigational system. Once in control, the students were able to shift the ship onto a new course, three degrees off the original one. As the navigational system reported location discrepancies and the crew initiated corrections, the White Rose deviated further from its original course. Although the electronic chart on the bridge of the White Rose showed that the ship was progressing along a straight line, crew and the students could see in its wake that there was a pronounced curve and the vessel had in fact turned. Professor Todd Humphreys of Cockrell's department of aerospace engineering and engineering mechanics who led the experiment said: “The ship actually turned and we could all feel it, but the chart display and the crew saw only a straight line.” Animation showing how the GPS spoofing of the yacht's navigation system took place. There was no alarms triggered on the yacht from the spoofing, unlike when GPS signals are blocked or jammed. To the ship's navigation system, the false signals from the spoofing device were indistinguishable to real ones and eventually, caused the yacht to move in a parallel track hundred metres along it s original course. Humphreys says that until the experiment was performed, he did not know that it was possible to spoof the navigation system of a marine vessel, or how difficult it was to detect such an attack. “With 90 per cent of the world’s freight moving across the seas and a great deal of the world’s human transportation going across the skies, we have to gain a better understanding of the broader implications of GPS spoofing,” Humphreys said. “This experiment is applicable to other semi-autonomous vehicles, such as aircraft, which are now operated, in part, by autopilot systems,” Humphreys said. “We’ve got to put on our thinking caps and see what we can do to solve this threat quickly,” he concluded. Copyright © SC Magazine, Australia

Security researcher Karsten Nohl says some SIM cards can be compromised because of wrongly configured Java Card software and weak encryption keys. Smartphones are susceptible to malware and carriers have enabled NSA snooping, but the prevailing wisdom has it there’s still one part of your mobile phone that remains safe and un-hackable: your SIM card. Yet after three years of research, German cryptographer Karsten Nohl claims to have finally found encryption and software flaws that could affect millions of SIM cards, and open up another route on mobile phones for surveillance and fraud. Nohl, who will be presenting his findings at the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas on July 31, says his is the first hack of its kind in a decade, and comes after he and his team tested close to 1,000 SIM cards for vulnerabilities, exploited by simply sending a hidden SMS. The two-part flaw, based on an old security standard and badly configured code, could allow hackers to remotely infect a SIM with a virus that sends premium text messages (draining a mobile phone bill), surreptitiously re-direct and record calls, and — with the right combination of bugs — carry out payment system fraud. Payment fraud could be a particular problem for mobile phone users in Africa, where SIM-card based payments are widespread. The deployment of so-called NFC payment technology, already slow to take off, could also be at risk, Nohl says, as well as the ability for carriers to track charges to each caller’s account. There’s no obvious pattern to the flaw beyond the premise of an older encryption standard. “Different shipments of SIM cards either have [the bug] or not,” says Nohl, who is chief scientist at risk management firm Security Research Labs. “It’s very random.” In his study, Nohl says just under a quarter of all the SIM cards he tested could be hacked, but given that encryption standards vary widely between countries, he estimates an eighth of the world’s SIM cards could be vulnerable, or about half a billion mobile devices. Nohl, who was profiled by Forbes’ Andy Greenberg in 2011 for his work on breaking mobile encryption standards, believes it unlikely that cyber criminals have already found the bug. Now that word of the vulnerability is out, he expects it would take them at least six months to crack it, by which time the wireless industry will have implemented available fixes. That effort may already be underway. Nohl says at least two large carriers have already tasked their staff with finding a patch for the SIM vulnerability, which they will share with other operators through the wireless trade body GSMA. “Companies are surprisingly open to the idea of working cooperatively on security topics because the competition is somewhere else,” says Nohl. “The competition is organized crime, not AT&T versus T-Mobile.” (The situation in similarly in finance, where payment services like MasterCard, Visa, and American Express will work together under industry association EMVco to improve security standards for smart cards.) The market for SIMs is almost entirely fed by mobile carriers, and supplied by two leading global vendors, Gemalto and Oberthur Technologies. Both have profited heavily from the huge growth in mobile handsets: two years ago there were 1 billion SIM cards worldwide, and today there are more than 5 billion, says ABI Research analyst John Devlin, though the market is slowly reaching a plateau. SIMs are thought to be one of the most secure parts of a phone, he added, and as the carrier’s property, are “key to their relationship between you and I, the subscriber.” Vodafone would not answer questions about the level of encryption its SIM cards used, and referred all media questions to GSMA. Both Verizon and AT&T said they knew of Nohl’s research, but said their SIM profiles were not vulnerable to the flaw. AT&T added that it had used SIMs with triple Data Encryption Standards (3DES) for almost a decade; Verizon did not specify why its SIMs were not vulnerable. The London-based GSMA said it had looked at Nohl’s analysis and concurred that “a minority of SIMs produced against older standards could be vulnerable.” It said it had already provided guidance to network operators and SIM vendors who could be impacted by the flaw. “There is no evidence to suggest that today’s more secure SIMs, which are used to support a range of advanced services, will be affected,” a spokesperson added. Karsten Nohl Nohl says that while AT&T and Verizon may benefit from robust SIM encryption standards, other carriers will use straight Data Encryption Standards (DES), guidelines developed in the 1970s that are fundamental to why he was able to “get root” on dozens of SIMs cards. “Give me any phone number and there is some chance I will, a few minutes later, be able to remotely control this SIM card and even make a copy of it,” Nohl says. SIM cards are essentially mini-computers with their own operating system and pre-installed software. To maintain security, many rely on a cryptographic standard called DES (digital encryption standard), which was invented by IBM in the 1970s and improved by the NSA. Some networks, like AT&T and the four major carriers in Germany, have moved away from using the old version of the standard, but others have not. Though Nohl didn’t identify a pattern to vulnerable SIMs in terms of manufacturers, the ones he could hack all used the old encryption standard. Key to the hack is Java Card, a general purpose programming language used on 6 billion SIM cards. If operators need to update something on your SIM, for instance allowing interoperability with a carrier in another country, it will execute the right Java Card programs on your SIM by sending your mobile a binary SMS. This is a text message you will never see, sent through a method called over-the-air programming (OTA). In early 2011, Nohl’s team started toying with the OTA protocol and noticed that when they used it to send commands to several SIM cards, some would refuse the command due to an incorrect cryptographic signature, while a few of those would also put a cryptographic signature on this error message. With that signature and using a well known cryptographic method called rainbow tables, Nohl was able to crack the encryption key on the SIM card in about one minute. Carriers use this key to remotely program a SIM, and it is unique to each card. “Anybody who learns the key of a particular SIM can load any application on the SIM he wants, including malicious code,” says Jasper Van Woudenberg, CTO North America of smart-card security firm Riscure. “We had almost given up on the idea of breaking the most widely deployed use of standard cryptography,” says Nohl, but it felt “great” to finally gain control of a SIM after many months of unsuccessful testing. With the all-important (and till-now elusive) encryption key, Nohl could download a virus onto the SIM card that could send premium text messages, collect location data, make premium calls or re-route calls. A malicious hacker could eavesdrop on calls, albeit with the SIM owner probably noticing some suspiciously-slow connections. Nohl found a second bug. Unrelated to the weak encryption key, it allows even deeper hacking on SIMs and is caused, Nohl says, by a mistake on the part of SIM card manufacturers. Java Card uses a concept called sandboxing, in which pre-installed programs like a Visa or PayPal app are shielded from one another and the rest of the SIM card. The term comes from the idea of only allowing programs to “play with their own toys, in their own sandbox,” says Nohl. “This sandboxing mechanism is broken in the most widely-used SIM cards.” The researcher says he found a few instances where the protocols on the SIM card allowed the virus he had sent to a SIM, to check the files of a payment app that was also installed on the card. The way this works is somewhat complex, but Nohl’s virus essentially gave the infected Java software a command it could not understand or complete – eg. asking for the 12th item in a 10-item list, leading the software to forgo basic security checks and granting the virus full memory access, or “root,” in cyber security parlance. In sum, a malicious hacker who wanted to use this method might start with a list of 100 phones. They could send a binary SMS to all of them, using a programmable cell phone connected to a computer. They might get 25 responses with cryptographic signatures, and dismiss the half that use a stronger security standard. From the rest, Nohl surmises they could crack the encryption key of perhaps 13 SIM cards, and send them a virus that breaks through the Java Card sandbox barriers and reads payment app details, as well as the master key of the SIM card. Who’s to blame for this and who can fix it? Nohl says broken Java sandboxing is a shortcoming of leading SIM card vendors like Gemalto and Oberthur. Riscure’s Van Woudenberg agrees. Gemalto which made about half its $2.5 billion revenue in 2012 selling SIM cards, said in an email to Forbes that its SIMs were “consistent with state-of-the-art and applicable security guidelines,” and that it had been working closely with GSMA and other industry bodies to look into Nohl’s research. Gemalto’s CEO Olivier Piou has said publicly that there are no security issues with mobile payments, and his company says on its website that SIM cards are “virtually impossible to crack.” Despite this, Nohl believes badly-configured Java Card sandboxing “affects every operator who uses cards from two main vendors,” including carriers like AT&T and Verizon who use robust encryption standards. Are SIM cards with these 3DES standards vulnerable? Nohl suggests they might be, and that he’ll expound on the details at Black Hat. At minimum it seems that carriers should upgrade to newer encryptions quickly, not just for the safety of their subscribers, but future revenue too. Payment providers like MasterCard and Visa will need to use the OTA protocol to fill SIM cards with Java applications, like credit card applets, and enable NFC-based payments on phones in the future — and they’ll pay carriers for the privilege of being on the SIM. “Operators see this as valuable real estate,” says Nohl, referring to this OTA communication channel. Leaving aside what this means for consumer privacy, Nohl’s findings may leave some carriers grappling with new questions over the security (and value) of this real estate. “Carriers and SIM card manufacturers do need to step up their security game for when payments arrive,” says Van Woudenberg. Banks are slow and cautious with new technology as they wait for it be proven secure, he adds, but “the mobile world moves much faster, as time-to-market is for them more important.” As mobile payments bring these two worlds together, Nohl’s research has shown the process of proving out security on SIMs could be more challenging than the key players originally thought. Sursa

ns? ce e asta? daca e blocat in recovery scoate bateria , nu se poate intampla nimic ! intri in recovery si dai un factory reset dupa in download mode si instalezi un android ... de preferat unul oficial!

Nine - It's Over Dog (Dmx Dis) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uL9S1QXXffU Si Playlistul

@rolly_love ... lasa-te de toate ... daca nici o distributie linux nu stii sa recunosti mai bine te lipsesti ! Citeste, invata si abia dupa daca ai nelamuriri poti pune intrebari .. nimeni nu iti da mura in gura !

@magnificul are dreptate ... este vb de metoda Evil Twins . Se creaza un ap cu acelasi ssid si bssid ca ap-ul tinta, se deconecteaza clientul pana cand se plictiseste si se conecteaza la ap-ul nostru si asa vom avea parola in clear text!

Daca spatiul de stocare iti permite foloseste dual boot ...

Multumesc tuturor pentru urari !

Merci mult la toata lumea !! @FiliBlox: Pentru ca eu sunt superstar ... (Glumesc bineinteles) @ionutcristea: La multi ani si tie in cazul asta !!

1:... ok .. daca vrei sa primesti ajutor posteaza si tu specificatiile complete ale adaptorului sau ale laptop-ului ! 2: nu o sa reusesti sa folosesti placa wireless a laptopului in masini virtuale .... nici un soft pt virtualizare nu suporta asa ceva ! 3: ce incerci sa faci ? "am vrut sa utilizez virtual box in dual cu kali linux-ul de la back track" ... eu nu inteleg nimic in ce ai zis aici ... virtualbox in dual ? wtf? 4: foloseste-te de documentatia de la kali (link) fa un stick si booteaza de pe el daca vrei sa folosesti linux fara dualboot sau fara sa stergi windows-ul (vezi ce downloadezi in functie de arhitectura procesorului) 5: cand ai nevoie de ajutor explica concret ce vrei sa faci, aparatura de care dispui, sistemele de operare si descrie clar si la obiect problemele cu care te comfrunti !!